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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arises from the remand of Joshua Bosier's prior successful appeal of 
the district court's sua sponte revocation of his probation. In Idaho Supreme Court 
Case No.34745, the Court of Appeals found that the district court had violated 
Mr. Bosier's constitutional rights to due process when the court sua sponte summoned 
Mr. Bosier into court and revoked his probation without any allegation that he had 
violated his probation and without any prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. 
State v. Bosier, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 439 at pp.2-3 (April 29, 2009) 
(hereinafter, Opinion). The Court of Appeals then vacated the district court's first and 
second amended judgments of conviction, but not his original judgment of conviction 
and sentence, and remanded the case "for reinstatement of the original probation." 
But upon remand, the district court in this case did not simply perform the task it 
was directed to - reinstatement of the original probation. Instead, the court decided to 
alter Mr. Bosier's sentence by ordering his underlying sentence and probation to run 
consecutively to sentences that he was serving arising from Canyon County 
proceedings. 
Mr. Bosier timely appeals from the district court's Third Amended Judgment of 
Conviction and Order Suspending Sentence, and asserts that the district court was 
without jurisdiction to alter his sentence given the directive of the Court of Appeals' 
Opinion in this case. Additionally, Mr. Bosier asserts that the district court erred in 
entering this third amended judgment because the district court unlawfully increased his 
sentence. Finally, Mr. Bosier asserts that the increase of his sentence upon remand 
from his successful appeal constituted a vindictive sentence that deprived him of due 
process of law. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
The following Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings were articulated in 
the Court of Appeals' prior opinion in this case: 
Bosier pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance, 
I.C. § 37-2732(c). In exchange for his guilty plea, the state dismissed 
additional charges, including an allegation that Bosier was a persistent 
violator. At that time, Bosier was involved in four different criminal cases in 
various stages before three different courts. The district court sentenced 
Bosier to a unified term of seven years, with a minimum period of 
confinement of three years. The district court suspended Bosier's 
sentence and placed him on probation for seven years. The district court 
also ordered the sentence to run concurrently with Bosier's sentence in 
another unrelated case for which he had been placed on probation. 
One month later, the district court summoned Bosier for another 
hearing. At that time, the district court explained that it was previously 
under the mistaken belief that Bosier had a retained jurisdiction 
opportunity in one of his other cases when, in fact, jurisdiction had been 
relinquished. The district court then entered an amended judgment of 
conviction sentencing Bosier to a unified term of seven years, with a 
minimum period of confinement of three years. The amended judgment of 
conviction had the effect of revoking Bosier's probation and reinstating the 
sentence of the original judgment of conviction. The district court ordered 
the sentence to run concurrently with ail other sentences currently being 
served by Bosier. 
One week later, Bosier wrote a letter to the district court alleging 
that it had revoked his probation without cause and asking the district 
court to reduce his sentence. The district court treated the letter as an 
I.C.R. 35 motion to reduce Bosier's sentence. After a hearing, the district 
court entered a second amended judgment of conviction modifying 
Bosier's sentence to a unified term of seven years, with a minimum period 
of confinement of two years. 
Opinion, pp.1-2. (See also Appellant's Brief in Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 34745 
(hereinafter, 34745 Appellant's Brief), pp.1-7.) 
On appeal, Mr. Bosier asserted that the district court violated his constitutional 
right to due process when the court sua sponte revoked his probation and executed his 
sentence without any allegation of a probation violation or any proof that he had violated 
the terms and conditions of his probation, and without any prior notice or provision for 
an opportunity to be heard.' (34745 Appellant's Brief, pp.8-15.) The Court of Appeals 
agreed with Mr. Bosier's assertions regarding the violation of his due process rights in 
light of the lack of prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. (Opinion, pp.2-3.) Based 
upon this finding, the Court of Appeals declined to address the other issues raised on 
appeal given that the lack of notice was deemed dispositive. (Opinion, pp.2-3.) 
As a remedy for the due process violation found, the Court of Appeals ordered 
the following: 
The district court violated Bosier's right to due process when it revoked his 
probation without notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard. 
Accordingly, Bosier's first and second amended judgments of conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance are vacated and the case 
remanded for reinsfatement of the original probation. 
Opinion, p.3. 
While the Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Bosier's first and second amended 
judgments of conviction, the court left Mr. Bosier's original judgment of conviction and 
sentence intact.' (Opinion, p.3 n.1; 34745 R., pp.42-48.) 
Mr. Bosier also asserted that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to 
further reduce Mr. Bosier's sentence upon revoking his probation. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.16-19.) This claim is not at issue in this appeal as it was rendered moot by the Court 
of Appeals' disposition in Mr. Bosier's earlier appeal. See, e.g., State v. Nab, 112 Idaho 
1139, 1140,739 P.2d 438,439 (Ct. App. 1987). 
The first and second amended judgments of conviction were entered by the district 
court after sua sponte revoking Mr. Bosier's probation. (34745 R., pp.53-55,63-65.) 
Upon remand, however, the district court did not follow the directive of the Court 
of Appeals to simply re-instate Mr. Bosier under the original terms and conditions of his 
probation, as originally set forth in his original judgment of conviction and sentence. 
instead, the district court decided to alter his judgment by making his underlying 
sentence, and the term of his probation consecutive to two sentences that he received 
from Canyon County.3 (Tr., p.6, L.10 - p.7, L.15; R., p.12; 34745 R., p.43.) 
Mr. Bosier's original judgment of sentence, which was expressly left in place by the 
Court of Appeals upon remand, provided that Mr. Bosier's judgment of conviction and 
sentence was "to commence immediately," but was suspended and that Mr. Bosier was 
placed on probation for seven years, "commencing on October 3, 2007." (Opinion, p.3 
n.1; 34745 R., p.43.) 
Mr. Bosier timely appeals from the district court's Third Amended Judgment of 
Conviction and Sentence. (R., pp.1 I ,  18.) 
Although never articulated by the district court, the "Canyon County sentences" 
referred to by the district court appear to be his sentences arising from Canyon County 
district court case nos. CR-03-23206 and CR-06-19488. (See 11/2/07 Tr., p.34, Ls.3- 
25.) Mr. Bosier has sought to augment the record with the register of actions from these 
two cases through a motion to augment that has been filed simultaneously with this 
brief. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court lack jurisdiction in this case to alter Mr. Bosier's underlying 
sentence upon remand from the ldaho Court of Appeals specifically directing the 
district court to reinstate "the original probation" as ordered in Mr. Bosier's 
original judgment of conviction? 
2. Did the district court err when it increased the aggregate term of Mr. Bosier's 
sentence through filing an amended judgment of conviction and sentence when 
the ldaho Court of Appeals did not vacate Mr. Bosier's original judgment of 
conviction and sentence? 
3. Did the district court impose a vindictive sentence when it increased the 
aggregate term of Mr. Bosier's judgment of conviction and sentence upon 
Mr. Bosier's successful appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction In This Case To Alter Mr. Bosier's Underlving 
Sentence Upon Remand From The Idaho Court Of Appeals Specificallv Directina The 
District Court To Reinstate "The Oriainal Probation" 
A. Introduction 
The Court of Appeals' prior opinion in this case remanded Mr. Bosier's case with 
specific instructions to the district court as to what actions could follow. Specifically, the 
Court of Appeals remanded this case with a directive to the court to reinstate the terms 
and conditions of Mr. Bosier's original probation as set forth in his original judgment of 
conviction and sentence. Because the district court took action that was in excess of 
the limited subject matter jurisdiction conferred by the Court of Appeals' Opinion to 
perform the ministerial task of reinstating Mr. Bosier's original judgment of conviction 
and terms and conditions of probation, and because the district court's action was 
further in contravention of I.A.R. 38, the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter 
Mr. Bosier's sentence upon remand. The district court's third amended judgment of 
conviction is therefore void, and this case should be remanded back to the district court 
with instructions to comply with the original directive as set forth by the Court of Appeals 
in the prior appeal in this case. 
B. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction In This Case To Alter Mr. Bosier's 
Underlying Sentence Upon Remand From The ldaho Court Of Appeals 
specific all^ Directing The District Court To Reinstate "The Original Probation" 
1. The District Court Lacked Subiect Matter Jurisdiction To Enter A New 
Judqment Of Conviction And Order Of Probation Where The Court Of 
Appeals Opinion Only Provided Jurisdiction For The District Court To 
Perform The Ministerial Task Of Re-Entering Mr. Bosier's Oriqinal 
Judgment Of Conviction And Order Of Probation 
"Issues about the district court's jurisdiction are issues of law, over which the 
Court exercises independent review." State v. Rogers, 140 ldaho 223, 227, 91 P.3e 
1127, 1131 (2004). The issue of whether the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over a particular case may be raised at any time, and cannot be waived by a 
party, nor can the lack of subject matter jurisdiction be consented to by the parties to the 
action. See, e.g., State v. Armsfrong, 146 ldaho 372, 374, 195 P.3d 731, 733 (Ct. App. 
2008). In light of this, a party may assert that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction in a case for the first time on appeal. Id. 
The Court in Rogers delineated what is meant by the term "subject matter 
jurisdiction": 
"Jurisdiction over the subject matter" has been variously defined as 
referring to (1) the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought; 
(2) the class of cases to which the particular one belongs and the nature 
of the relied sought; (3) the power of a court to hear and determine cases 
of the general class to which the particular one belongs; (4) both the class 
of cases and the particular subject matter involved; and (5) the 
competency of the court to hear and decide the case. 
Rogers, 140 ldaho at 228,91 P.3d at 1131. 
And the competency of the district court to hear and decide substantive issues in 
a case is generally terminated once a dispositive appellate ruling on those issues has 
been rendered, unless the directive from the appellate court expressly provides for the 
further exercise of the district court's discretion. "Absent a statute or rule extending its 
jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once 
the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time to appeal or affirmance of 
the judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 ldaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 
(2003). The district court does not enjoy "perpetual jurisdiction to amend or set aside 
final judgments in cases that they have heard." Id. Thus, as noted by the Court in 
Jakoski, the final determination of an appeal can operate to terminate the general 
subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to take action in a particular case. Id; see 
also Armstrong, 146 ldaho at 378, 195 P.3d at 737. 
While an order remanding a case to the district court can confer subject matter 
jurisdiction to take the actions directed by the appellate court, the degree to which 
jurisdiction is conferred is wholly dependant on the nature of the directive from the 
appellate court. "The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has authority to take 
actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions 
directed by the appellate court." State v. Hosey, 134 ldaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 
1104 (2000). "Subsidiary issues," do not arise in cases where the sole action that the 
district court is directed to undertake from the appellate court is a "ministerial act," such 
as entering an amended judgment. Hummer v. Evans, 132 ldaho 830, 833, 979 P.2d 
1188, 1191 (1999). Merely requiring the district court to comply with the directive of an 
opinion from the appellate court is not sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on 
the district court to consider substantive issues in a case. Id. As noted by the Court in 
Hummer: 
Indeed, the language of the Remittitur provides that the opinion of the 
Court directs whether there any continuing jurisdiction of the district judge 
exists. In this case, our ruling did not open the door for the district judge 
to address substantive issues in the case. 
In this case, as in Hummer, the directive of the Court of Appeals in the prior 
appellate decision in this case directed the district court to take the purely ministerial 
action of reinstating Mr. Bosier on probation under the terms and conditions that were 
previously established in the original judgment of conviction in this case. (Opinion, p.3.) 
This directive did not confer any subject matter jurisdiction on the district court to re- 
litigate its sentencing decision - the court was merely directed to give force and effect to 
the prior sentencing order that placed Mr. Bosier on probation. As such, the district 
court's third amended judgment of conviction in this case was entered without subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
2. Pursuant To I.A.R. 38. The District Court Lacked The Authority To 
Disreqard The Directive Of The Court Of Appeals' Opinion And To Instead 
Resentence Mr. Bosier 
Idaho Appellate Rule 38 provides, in pertinent part, that: 
When the opinion filed has become final in accordance with this rule, the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall issue and file a remittitur with the district 
court or administrative agency appealed from and mail copies to all parties 
to the appeal and the presiding district court judge or chairman of the 
agency. The remittitur shall advise the district court or administrative 
agency that the opinion has become final and that the district court or 
administrative agency shall forthwith comply with the directive of the 
opinion. 
I.A.R. 38(c) (emphasis added). 
The language of this rule is mandatory - once an opinion becomes final, the 
district court is required to comply with the specific directives provided by the opinion 
rendered by either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme C o ~ r t . ~  
In this case, however, the district court chose to disregard the directives 
established by the prior Court of Appeals Opinion in this case. Instead of performing 
the task directed to it - to reinstate Mr. Bosier on the "original probation" as set forth in 
his original judgment of conviction - the district court unilaterally determined that it 
wanted to sentence Mr. Bosier anew. Because the district court failed to comply with 
the provisions of I.A.R. 38, which circumscribe the court's authority to act upon remand, 
the district court acted in excess of its jurisdiction and abused its discretion. 
The District Court Erred When It Increased The Aqqreqate Term Of Mr. Bosier's 
Sentence Through Filing An Amended Judqment Of Conviction And Sentence When 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals Did Not Vacate Mr. Bosier's Oriqinal Judqment Of 
Conviction And Sentence 
A. Introduction 
In addition to acting without subject matter jurisdiction, the terms of the third 
amended judgment of conviction and order of probation entered by the district court in 
this case constitute an abuse of discretion. The district court in this case acted well 
outside of clearly established applicable legal standards when the court increased the 
aggregate length of Mr. Bosier's sentence beyond that articulated in Mr. Bosier's 
original judgment of conviction and sentence, which was left intact by the prior Court of 
Appeals' opinion in this case. 
Remittitur was issued in Mr. Bosier's original appeal on May 21, 2009. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Increased The Aggreaate Term Of Mr. Bosier's 
Sentence Throuqh Filinn An Amended Judgment Of Conviction And Sentence 
When The ldaho Court Of Appeals Did Not Vacate Mr. Bosier's Original 
Judament Of Conviction And Sentence 
Sentencing determinations are generally reviewed by this Court for an abuse of 
discretion. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Jafek, 141 ldaho 71, 74, 106 P.3d 397, 400 (2005). 
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a 
multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the proper 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to its 
exercise of discretion; and (3) whether the court reached its decision through an 
exercise of reason. Id. at 401, 106 P.3d at 75. 
The district court's entry of the third amended judgment of conviction and order of 
probation runs afoul of the second prong of the abuse of discretion standard because 
the district court exceeded its authority when it increased Mr. Bosier's sentence from the 
sentence and order of probation that was originally entered in this case. 
"When the trial court has sentenced the defendant and has suspended execution 
of the sentence and placed the defendant on probation, upon revocation of probation 
the court cannot resentence the defendant." Stafe v. Thomas, 146 ldaho 592, 594, 199 
P.3d 769, 771 (2008). Additionally, it has long been established in ldaho that, "when a 
trial court initially sentenced a criminal defendant to a definite term of imprisonment, but 
has suspended the sentence and granted probation, it may not later upon revocation of 
probation set aside that sentence and increase the term of imprisonment." Stafe v. 
Pedraza, 101 ldaho 440, 443, 614 P.2d 980, 983 (1980). Though this clear principle 
was established over a quarter century ago, the district court failed to abide by this clear 
legal standard applicable to its exercise of discretion. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals only vacated the district court's first and 
second amended judgments of conviction in Mr. Bosier's case -the court expressly left 
his original judgment of conviction and sentence intact and ordered the district court to 
reinstate Mr. Bosier on probation under these terms. (Opinion, p.3 n.1.) This is 
consistent with prior precedent in which ldaho courts have recognized that, upon 
vacating an amended judgment that alters a sentence, the original sentence remains in 
effect. See State v. Allen, 144 ldaho 875, 878, 172 P.3d 1150, 1153 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Therefore, in Mr. Bosier's case, he has been sentenced to a definite term of 
imprisonment under the terms and conditions of his original judgment of conviction and 
order suspending his sentence. (34745 R., pp.42-47.) Despite the fact that Mr. Bosier's 
sentence had already been pronounced, the district court has simply sought to override 
and increase the sentence that was originally put in place through entering a third 
amended judgment of conviction. (R., pp.11-15.) 
This Third Amended Judgment of Conviction, and Order Suspending Sentence 
imposed two increases to Mr. Bosier's original judgment of conviction and order of 
probation. First, it adds the new term that Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence is to "run 
consecutively to the defendant's Canyon County sentences." (R., p.12.) Second, it 
alters Mr. Bosier's term of probation so that it is to commence "upon the defendant's 
release from prison," rather than the original term which set Mr. Bosier's probation to 
commence "on October 3, 2007." (R., p.12; 34745 R., p.43.) Both alterations result in 
an increased sentence against Mr. Bosier. 
For purposes of determining whether punishment has been increased, ldaho 
courts have consistently viewed an order that a sentence is to run consecutively to 
another sentence as an increase in the sentence, as it constitutes an increase in the 
aggregate time that a defendant must serve. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 ldaho 482, 
487-490, 180 P.3d 521, 526-529 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Whittle, 145 ldaho 49, 52, 
175 P.3d 211, 214 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Hoskins, 131 ldaho 670, 673, 962 P.2d 
1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Castro, 131 ldaho 274, 276, 954 P.2d 692, 694 
(Ct. App. 1998); State V. Amerson, 129 ldaho 395, 407-408, 925 P.2d 399, 411-412 
(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Alberts, 121 ldaho 204, 207, 824 P.2d 135, 138 (Ct. App. 
1992). In Alberts, the Court of Appeals specifically noted that the effect of an increase 
in the overall, aggregate sentence by ordering a sentence to run consecutively, rather 
than concurrently, to other sentences is subject to appellate review for whether this 
creates an excessive sentence. Alberts, 121 ldaho at 207, 824 P.2d at 138. 
This issue has previously been decided by the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Mendenhall, 106 ldaho 388, 679 P.2d 665 (Ct. App. 1984). In Mendenhall, the issue for 
the court's resolution was whether sentences originally ordered to run concurrently 
could be changed upon the revocation of the defendant's probation so that the 
sentences would be set to run consecutively. Mendenhall, 106 ldaho at 390, 679 P.2d 
at 667. The Mendenhall Court found that such an alteration of a sentence upon 
revoking probation was impermissible because this operates to increase the term of the 
defendant's sentence when probation is revoked. Id. at 394-395, 679 P.2d at 671-672. 
As noted by the court: 
By making the sentences consecutive without adjusting their terms, the 
judge went beyond mere correction of the sentences. He imposed a 
harsher penalty. That decision implicates the decision found in State v. 
Pedraza. 
Id. at 394,679 P.2d at 671. 
The case law is consistent in other closely related contexts as well. It has 
likewise been held to be error for a district court to order that the sentence originally 
imposed, but suspended, would be served consecutively for a later sentence imposed 
for a crime which occurred during the period of probation. See King v. State, 114 ldaho 
442, 446-447, 757 P.2d 705, 709-710 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. West, 105 ldaho 505, 
506-507, 670 P.2d 912, 913-914 (Ct. App. 1983). In particular, the court in King noted 
that, "we perceived no difference between the alteration of [the defendant's] sentence, 
to make it consecutive, and the 'increase' referred to in Pedraza." King, 114 ldaho at 
446, 757 P.2d at 709. 
In this case, the district court imposed a harsher sentence than the sentence 
imposed in the original judgment of conviction in this case, which was specifically left 
intact by the Court of Appeals' prior decision. The district court's third amended 
judgment of conviction, the court added terms that were not present in Mr. Bosier's 
original judgment of conviction -that Mr. Bosier's sentence was to run consecutively to 
his Canyon County sentences and that Mr. Bosier's probation was not to commence 
until his release from prison (as opposed to his suspended sentence commencing 
"immediately" and his probation "commencing on October 3, 2007"). (R., p.12; 34745 
R., p.43.) 
The alteration made by the district court impermissibly increased the aggregate 
term of Mr. Bosier's sentence in this case. The district court lacked the authority to do 
so based upon well-established and clearly applicable standards of law. As such, the 
district court erred in this case in entering the third amended judgment of conviction that 
increased Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence and the terms of his probation. 
The District Court Imposed A Vindictive Sentence When It Increased The Ancyregate 
Term Of Mr. Bosier's Judnment Of Conviction And Sentence Upon Mr. Bosier's 
Successful Appeal 
As an initial matter, Mr. Bosier did not raise any assertion that his resentencing to 
a greater aggregate term upon his successful appeal of the district court's sua sponte 
revocation of his probation constituted a vindictive sentence that violated his due 
process rights. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has already determined that the 
"right to be free from vindictive sentencing" constitutes a fundamental error that can be 
reviewed for the first time on appeal, "because it would go to the foundation or basis of 
[the defendant's] rights." State v. Robbins, 123 ldaho 527, 530, 850 P.2d 176, 179 
(1993). As such, Mr. Bosier's assertion of vindictiveness in his resentencing is properly 
justiciable on appeal. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce articulated the parameters 
of what constitutes a vindictive sentence that violates the due process protections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-724 (1969). The 
Court in Pearce established that the imposition of a heightened penalty on a criminal 
defendant for successfully asserting his or her statutory or constitutional rights is a 
violation of due process. Id. This is because, "penalizing those who choose to exercise 
constitutional rights 'would be patently unconstitutional."' Id. at 724 (citing U.S. v. 
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968). Additionally, the threat of heightened punishment 
imposed as a result of the exercise of rights will likely create a chilling effect on the 
exercise of rights by other defendants. Id. 
It is worth noting that nothing in this standard requires a showing of anything 
more than the fact that heightened punishment was imposed on a criminal defendant 
that was solely attributable to the exercise of his or her rights. The term "vindictive" as 
that term is used in the context of sentencing, has a very particular and narrow 
meaning. See, e.g., Nairn v. Sfafe, 837 So.2d 519, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). As 
stated by the court in Nairn: 
As used in the sentencing process the word "vindictive" has lost its 
dictionary definitions. The sentencing term "vindictive" has become a 
"term of art," describing the legal effect of an objective course of action, 
generally not implying any personal or subjective animosity on the part of 
the trial judge. That being the case a defendant challenging a sentence 
as being vindictive may not need to demonstrate that the sentencing judge 
was acting out of any degree of malice. 
Nairn, 837 So.2d at 519 (internal citations omitted) 
In this case, the same judge as originally sentenced Mr. Bosier sought to 
increase his sentence after Mr. Bosier successfully pursued his appeal. (R., p.15; 
34745 R., p.46.) Although there was some confusion regarding the Canyon County 
district courts' dispositions on the charges arising from that county, the district court was 
aware of Mr. Bosier's charges arising from Canyon County at the time that Mr. Bosier 
was originally sentenced. (10/3/07 Tr., p.21, L.13 - p.23, L.20; 34745 PSI, pp.7-8.) In 
fact, the underlying circumstances of the Canyon County cases were set forth in the 
presentence investigation report prepared prior to Mr. Bosier's original sentencing 
wherein Mr. Bosier was originally placed on probation. (34745 PSI, p.8.) 
No additional facts were adduced at the hearing on remand of Mr. Bosier's case 
prior to the district court increasing Mr. Bosier's sentence, other than Mr. Bosier's 
participation in therapeutic programming while incarcerated. (See 6/17/09 
Tr., generally.) The only new information would appear to show Mr. Bosier's positive 
behavior during his incarceration. Therefore, other than the fact that Mr. Bosier had 
successfully overturned the district court's sua sponte revocation of his probation on 
appeal, there was no materially new information that would support the district court's 
increase in Mr. Bosier's sentence. It would appear that the district court was simply 
seeking to circumvent what the Court of Appeals had already stated was improper in 
Mr. Bosier's prior appeal - to  change Mr. Bosier's judgment of conviction and sentence 
without any prior notice to Mr. Bosier, nor with any allegation that Mr. Bosier had 
violated the terms and conditions of his probation. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bosier respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's Third 
Amended Judgment of Conviction and Order Suspending Sentence; and remand this 
case with the instructions to the district court to re-instate Mr. Bosier on probation under 
his original Judgment of Conviction and Order Suspending Sentence that was entered 
by the district court on October 5, 2007. 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 2009. 
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